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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to consider the extent to which individuals are 
institutionalized by a religious tradition. I will base my discussion on Whitehouse’s 
theory of ‘modes of religiosity’ and a brief description of three life histories of Western 
individuals who joined the Hare Krishna movement (ISKCON). I shall attempt to 
analyze how they use their knowledge of this tradition to readjust and reinterpret 
their religious beliefs and practices from the perspective of a local and global mode 
of institutionalization. I shall also briefly discuss these institutional dynamics which, 
at the same time, create equality and alterity so that individuals can possess a sense of 
both religious identity and belonging to a religious community.
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Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es realizar un análisis acerca de los modos de 
institucionalización a los cuales los individuos suelen pasar cuando están involucrados 
en una determinada tradición religiosa. Basándome teóricamente en la teoría de Whi-
tehouse acerca de los ‘modos de religiosidad’ y, además, empíricamente, en tres historias 
de vidas de individuos occidentales que hacen parte de la tradición del movimiento 
Hare Krishna (ISKCON) intentaré analizar de qué manera, a través del conocimiento 
de dicha tradición, ellos readaptan y reinterpretan sus creencias y prácticas religiosas 
desde el punto de vista de un modo de institucionalización local y global. A partir de 
ahí finalizo con una breve consideración acerca de estas dinámicas institucionales que, 
al mismo tiempo, genera igualdad y alteridad a los individuos para poseer un sentido de 
identidad religiosa y, además, la pertenencia en la comunidad religiosa.
Palabras claves: Hare Krishna, identidad, comunidad, transmisión religiosa.
1 It is part of the full text presented at the 23rd European Conference on South Asian Studies (ECSAS) at 
the University of Zurich – Switzerland - during 23 to 26 July 2014.
2 Researcher of the project RELIG 2014 – AGAUR – in the Department of Anthropology at the Univer-
sitat Rovira i Virgili – Tarragona – Spain.
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I will start this text by making some inferences about our relationship with 
our inner selves, outer selves and others. I assume that there are three stages 
in socialization. The first is the one that makes us aware that ‘we are’ with no 
label at all. Perhaps we first become aware of this stage when we are born: the 
moment we open our eyes to take in and sense the reality around us. In this 
stage there are no concepts or labels, only the supposed fact that ‘I AM’. I have 
assumed that this is the initial step in socialization because it is connected with 
the second stage: the perception of the self. As the first stage is considered 
to be the perception of the senses, the second is the perception of the self. 
This means that a being starts to perceive him/herself as a person – both the 
inner concept of ‘me’ and the perception of ‘mine’ – through interaction with an 
outside community. I will give an example: our families are the first communities 
which establish our possession of ourselves when they refer to us by our names. 
However, the collective selves surrounding us determine different social 
categories of our self-perception. This does not mean that our self-perception 
comes from a group of people, but from the intercommunication between what 
we think we are and what other people consider that we are supposed to be. By 
means of this communication process it can be shown that there is a system of 
knowledge and thoughts that supports the concepts of ‘me’, ‘mine’ and ‘myself ’. 
In other words, I assume here a religious tradition as a system of knowledge 
that permeates subjective and collective thoughts which impose the ways in 
which people not only perceive that they have a specific religious identity, but 
also connect with a religious community. This assumption is also considered in 
Cohen’s studies (1994), when the author argues that we become communities 
by the imposition of social categories: 
The state and other powerful social agencies compel us to compromise our 
individuality in our dealings with them by squeezing us into categories. The 
effect of this constraint is that we belong to society as members of collective 
entities (whether categories or groups) rather than as individuals. The 
application form compels me to render myself in ways which are not of my 
choosing. It would be a futile gesture to demand that whoever reviews my 
application for a passport or a driving license or a job or a club membership 
should consider – ME – the whole man. Instead, I have to comfort my 
conscious self into: husband; father of three sons; university professor; born 
in London; resident in Edinburgh; bearer of visible identifying features, 
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etc., etc. My protest that these structural properties taken together do not 
add up to me are of no account: indeed, it is mark of my eccentricity. Our 
social membership requires us repeatedly to belittle ourselves in this way. 
Individuality and socialness seem to be in contradiction to each other (Cohen, 
1994: 12).
In accordance with Cohen, the author cannot accept a notion of ME as 
a whole man based on social categories alone. It means that a sense of ME 
would exist beyond social categories as in the first stage of socialization argued 
above. The second stage – the sense’s perception of “me” – and the third stage 
of socialization – the perception of “mine” through others – are surrounded by 
the imposition of different meanings of social categories which ourselves and 
others establish for us. This is a fundamental concept which social scientists 
have been debating ever since the advent of classical social theory, especially in 
Durkheim’s and Mauss’s studies. Cohen (1994) quoted Mauss’s studies on the 
‘notion of person’ as a ‘social structure’:
Mauss’s concern with the person or self took the form of a cross-cultural 
review of the degrees of license afforded by cultures (and their legal and 
religious institutions) to individuals and individualism. He attempted 
to distinguish the moi [eu], the conscious self from the personne and the 
personage, the socially and culturally constituted personalities. However, he 
still focused, not surprisingly, on structure rather than experience; and his moi 
was a poor, attenuated creature, governed and determined by cultural rules. 
While the discrimination of terms he proposed was promising, he simply did 
not take it very far. His motivation may well have been linguistic rather than 
theoretical – that is, as an attempt to sort out the variety of terms available in 
French to refer to the first-person subject (none of which is a precise analogue 
of the English ‘self ’), rather than to render structuralism more sensitive to 
human experience (Cohen, 1994: 28).
Actually, Cohen’s main criticisms of the classical social theorists were their 
limited focus on structure instead of experience, which makes the notion of 
Me/Self poor, because it was related only by the different meaning of the roles 
imposed by the social structure. 
Using Cohen’s argumentation, I will follow ‘the path of self-experience’ to 
give evidence of changes caused by the life experience of three social agents, 
who use their knowledge of the Gaudiya Vaishnavism tradition to readjust and 
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reinterpret their religious beliefs and practices from the perspective of a local 
and global mode of institutionalization. 
By global and local modes of institutionalization, I am referring to a kind 
of discourse.3 The global mode is the Hare Krishna movement’s discourses, 
which are reproduced in different countries and on the Internet.4 The local 
discourse is the personal narrative of the devotees’ experiences that are 
connected with the symbolism of this tradition where they live. However, 
to explain institutionalization, I assume any kind of knowledge to be part of 
an institution. And knowledge – in this case knowledge of a tradition – is a 
shared collective thought that might be discursively reproduced either globally 
or locally.
Broadly speaking, global institutionalization is observed when devotees all 
perform in the same way in the public sphere (that is to say in videos on internet, 
in the streets and in the temples around the world”. One example would be 
when they “chant and dance Hare Krishna together”. Local institutionalization 
is individual experience (personal experience) and it is perceived only by 
individuals where they live. These differences in institutionalization make it 
possible to distinguish the predominance of the individual over the collective 
and vice-versa and measure the extent to which knowledge of a religious 
tradition sustains believers. Below, on the basis of three interviews, I go further 
into what I mean by local and global institutionalization. 
1. Death as a symbol for RM Mataji and JB Mataji to 
exist in Krishna Consciousness
I interviewed RM Mataji and JB Mataji when I was doing fieldwork at a Hare 
Krishna community (ISKCON temple) in Barcelona on March 30, 2009. 
They were two senior female devotees who have been living in Hare Krishna 
temples for more than twenty years.  
The first interview was with RM Mataji, a lady who is nearly sixty years old. 
She was born in Holland and joined the Hare Krishna movement in 1988 in 
Amsterdam: 
3 I use the term discourse as Potter does (1997:146). According to Potter discourse analysis, DA, ‘emphasi-
zes the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse’.
4 I carried out fieldwork about the Hare Krishna movement in Brazil, Spain, England and India. This 
fieldwork led me to notice such a global discourse that I defined it as global institutionalization. 
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Two matajis [female devotees] came to visit us. We were very impressed by the 
books. We decided to buy four of the books they showed us – the Bhagavad 
Gita and three cantos of Srimad Bhagavatam – and also a vegetarian cook 
book. We had already been vegetarians for many years. We gave a nice 
donation. And then they invited us for the Sunday feast. Two days later, we 
decided to go to Amsterdam and look for ourselves. We had never heard 
anything about Hare Krishna. But I found out that I had already been 
studying the Bhagavad Gita for two years. But the course was given by an 
impersonalist. He was a teacher giving a course on the Bhagavad Gita. I was 
very interested in philosophy. I went there every month, month after month 
of sessions. I was dissatisfied because I couldn’t grasp what he really wanted to 
say. But when an impersonalist starts to explain the Bhagavada Gita you can’t 
understand anything. I became more and more frustrated. And that moment, 
I was actually praying to God: ‘If you exist can you please show me something 
that I can see with my eyes?’ And the telephone was ringing. I was a little bit 
reluctant to pick the telephone up because I was a bit emotional. But I did. 
That was the first appointment.
It can be seen from the narrative above that RM Mataji and her husband 
were motivated by the Bagavad Gita because they found in it explanations that 
fitted the expectations of their belief system. In this case, I assume that the 
knowledge of this tradition has been privatized to suit their personal issues. 
What I want to make clear here is that a subjective experience has been adapted 
by the knowledge of a tradition. This means that people’s lives can be changed 
not only by the structure of a tradition but also by personal experience. In their 
case, they were searching for a ‘concept of god’ which could be rationalized in 
their life context. Below is another narrative describing something about RM 
Mataji’s life that was significant in defining her identity as a devotee:  
For me Krishna Consciousness … I was looking so much for absolute truth in 
my life. I looked in many different places. I was very eager, because when I was 
36 years old I had a near death experience in a hospital during surgery and of 
course it was for some purpose. It was not happening for nothing. I had a very 
serious operation and I died. I saw everything happening on the monitor’s 
screen. It flatlined, I died, I was watching and I was thinking, “OK, that’s it.” I 
didn’t care about it. […] it happened. Because I went into the operation with 
the wrong consciousness and it happened. But I had to come out because the 
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time was not right. […] It was before I joined movement, and because all this 
happened to me I was more convinced to look for the truth. I was searching 
for information in libraries, books and shops. I wanted to find books about 
reincarnation. And of course you find a lot of books. I read a lot of books on 
this subject. It was true what happened there but you couldn’t talk to anybody. 
They didn’t believe me, not even the doctor. 
RM Mataji’s near death experience became a reality that has endured over 
time and has been transformed into a search for her personal truth. Here, I 
assume truth to be a kind of knowledge and in a previous study (Adami 2013) 
I refer to this kind of experience as an ‘existential boundary experience’ by which 
I mean an impact experience that integrates a form of knowledge into people’s 
lives. This knowledge endures over time and defines meanings about identities 
and a sense of community. RM Mataji’s narrative suggests that she found the 
answers she was looking for, her truth, in the tradition of the Hare Krishna 
movement (ISKCON). Through such an ‘existential boundary experience’ she 
was able to find a system of knowledge (the Hare Krishna movement) which 
allowed her to understand her personal truth. The experience was an ‘encounter 
of knowledge’ which supported her identify as a devotee and a member of the 
Hare Krishna community. 
The second life story narrative also refers to death, in this case, in JB 
Mataji’s Krishna consciousness. She says that she had to be reborn to Krishna 
consciousness in order to ultimately know the ‘real meaning of happiness’. 
Before she knew Krishna consciousness, there was no sense of meaning in 
her life. She was unhappy with her family and friends because of an impact 
experience that she had been through when she was 16:  
When I was 16 I had a child who I gave up for adoption. But I didn’t process 
the whole experience. I was very unhappy, I didn’t know why. And I was 
looking for shelter, obviously. And I was stupid I could have done different 
things but I was completely blocked. I didn’t have much faith in material 
happiness and at the same time I couldn’t find a good spiritual alternative. […] 
I was 19 when I first saw devotees on the street. When I was 18 in Canada, 
in Vancouver [first time]. I asked a friend who they were. She was into this 
impersonal thing. She said they were Hare Krishna, very high people. And 
then I said OK. But, finally some months later someone gave me a magazine; 
a devotee gave me a magazine. I couldn’t afford to give any money but he gave 
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me the magazine for free so I carried the magazine around with me. I didn’t 
read it at first but I liked it, very colorful pictures.
When she met the devotees a second time she decided to follow them and 
become a Hare Krishna devotee: 
I think it was Krishna. He was saying: ‘Yes, that’s what you are looking for’ 
and I tried. ‘This is exactly what you want’ […] and another voice was saying 
Krishna is not god. I didn’t like this voice. The other voice was very friendly, 
very kind so I listened to the right voice. The devotee asked me if I had any 
questions. He told me that it was not so easy to be a Hare Krishna. I replied 
by saying that anything was better than the life I was living. Finally, when I 
read this article I was ready. The time was right and I joined. I think it took me 
another, let me see, took me at least another 20 years before I could look back 
and clearly see the events that led to my journey. […] [What about the family?] 
They didn’t… I left. That day my friend was sleeping in the apartment. I went 
there to get a few little things. I left her sleeping there […] And my family 
didn’t know where I was […] Anyway now my connection with my family is 
very good, very, very good. Finally, it took a long time. First of all, it took a long 
time to find out where I was. Second, a clear understanding of the situation. 
Actually, they understood my reasons. I mean the family. The history was 
quite difficult so they haven’t asked me why I left home, why I left everything. 
They know. 
I have assumed that both life story narratives are about the sort of experiences 
that relate individuals to collective entities so that they can ‘encounter’ a meaning 
of identity and a sense of community. The term ‘encounter’ is used to express a 
‘social fact’ that does not take place in only one direction. In other words, the 
meaning of identity and the sense of community are constantly negotiating 
their representation with each other. Each collective representation is a form of 
knowledge so that the individual can find institutionalization either subjectively 
or collectively. When the knowledge brought by the individual predominates 
over the knowledge of the religious tradition (collective representation), this is 
the private level of institutionalization, since the individual constructs his or 
her personal self-knowledge from the understanding of the religious tradition 
he or she is willing to follow. On the other hand, when the objective knowledge 
of a religious tradition predominates over the individual’s subjectivity without 
impacting on his or her personal uniqueness, a public institutionalization takes 
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place, as this form of institutionalization is the one given to everyone with no 
personal differentiation at all. I am not saying that these forms of representation 
take place in a linear sequence. Actually, they are used to measure the influence 
of the individual upon the community and vice-versa. The word predominance 
expresses the levels (subjective and objective) on which I am interested in 
displaying them so that the private and public institutional dimensions can be 
perceived.
So far, I have discussed how knowledge of the Krishna Consciousness 
tradition was transmitted to these devotees. Basically this sort of religious 
transmission is carried out by cognitive mechanisms. To explain the public and 
private institutionalization classification, Whitehouse’s cognitive explanation 
of modes of religiosity is pertinent. 
Whitehouse (2002) has identified two modes of religiosity which 
encompass two sets of dynamics. These dynamics involve the memories and 
the motivations that individuals and collectives use to engage in a religious 
tradition and remain part of it. The mechanisms of memory and motivation 
define the modes of religious transmission:
There are basically two kinds of memory: implicit and explicit (Graf and 
Schachter, 1985), implicit memory deals with things we know without being 
aware of knowing (such as the varied forms of procedural competence required 
in successfully riding a bicycle). Explicit memory deals with things we know 
at a conscious level, and can be further sub-divided into two types: short-
term and long-term. Short-term memory enables us to hold onto concepts 
for a matter of seconds (e.g., a new phone number, which we might remember 
just long enough to write it down before forgetting it). Long-term memory 
enables us to hold onto concepts for hours, and in some cases for a whole 
lifetime. Long-term memory can also be sub-divided into two types: semantic 
and episodic. Semantic memory consists of “general knowledge” about the 
world (e.g., how to behave in restaurants or what is the capital city of France, 
etc.). We can seldom recall how or when we acquired this sort of knowledge. 
By contrast, episodic memory consists of specific events in our life experience 
(e.g., our first kiss, the death of a beloved relative, the day war broke out, 
etc). These types of memory are activated very differently in doctrinal and 
imagistic modes of religiosity (Whitehouse, 2002: 296). 
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The distinction between the doctrinal and imagistic modes of religiosity 
defined by Whitehouse can, theoretically, help to support the dynamics of the 
public and private institutionalization mentioned above:
One of the central characteristics of the doctrinal mode is the frequent 
repetition of both ritual and dogma. Many of the ceremonies performed, 
for instance, in the holy places of doctrinal religions, along with the 
reciting of texts, prayers, and liturgical formulae, are encoded in semantic 
memory. Routinization is directly connected to the style of codification: the 
implicational logic of doctrinal systems, expressed in language (sacred texts, 
sermons, theological debates, and so on), can only exercise a continuous and 
stable influence on people’s attitudes, beliefs, and actions if it is frequently 
reviewed. The processing of religious materials in semantic memory has 
important sociological implications (Whitehouse, 2000: 9).
From another perspective, religion can be transmitted by the episodic 
memory, which leads to the imagistic mode: 
By contrast, the rituals and images of the imagistic mode are primarily 
encoded in episodic memory. In many societies, religious life is focused around 
very infrequent, traumatic ritual episodes. Rites of initiation, for instance, 
commonly involve the terrorizing and torture of novices and the challenging of 
everyday knowledge through the partial transmission of esoteric revelations. 
Similar patterns may be identified in a variety of ideologically distinct religious 
systems (from climactic forms of millenarism to diabolical cults). The shock 
and arousal entailed in such contexts produce enduring episodic memories, 
and even classic flashbulb experiences. If you ask participants to describe 
what occurred in a given ceremony of this type several years afterwards, their 
accounts will not be based primarily on semantic knowledge. On the contrary, 
we would expect to be told exactly who the participants were, along with 
many peculiar details of their behavior. Common identity among religious 
adherents in the imagistic mode is fundamentally particularistic, based on 
lasting episodic memories of undergoing the traumatic lows and ecstatic 
highs of sacred events together with a specifiable group of individuals. The 
longevity and intensity of such memories corresponds to the strength and 
inviolability of the cohesion which they engender (Whitehouse, 2000: 10).
It is very important to make clear that Whitehouse (2004: 75-76) did not say 
that a particular ritual, for instance, is doctrinal or imagistic. What the author 
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says is that its long-term reproduction through the innumerable thoughts and 
actions of many people results in the coalescence of features specified by the 
modal theory. These features, in other words, are discernible only as marked 
tendencies within a religious tradition, taken in the round. What the theory 
of modes of religiosity sets out to explain, then, is the tendency for religious 
systems to gravitate toward divergent attractor positions. 
Using Whitehouse’s theory I have related the public mode of 
institutionalization to the doctrinal mode of religiosity and the private mode 
of institutionalization with the imagistic mode of religiosity. This means that if 
individuals are to be part of a religious tradition they need to be encompassed 
by both modes of institutionalization simultaneously. 
The two life histories mentioned above describe a transmission of the 
Krishna consciousness tradition based on their episodic memory because it 
was connected with their existential boundary experience. These devotees were 
fully engaged in the organization ISKCON, and practically spent their whole 
lives serving ‘Prabhupada’s mission’.5 Actually, the transmission of the imagistic 
tradition creates strong links with the organization because the devotee is 
doing something that overarches his/her private, personal convictions. It 
is considered a private institutionalization because it is independent of the 
religious organization. The devotee can be part of a religious organization so 
that they can engage with the tradition privately.
The third life narrative is by an Indian-born British woman who has been 
living in London since her youth. I interviewed Ruckmini (24/08/2009) when 
I was doing fieldwork on Hindu communities in Harrow, London. I rented 
a room in her house so that I could live with her family for a while. Broadly 
speaking they considered themselves Hindus. However, Ruckmini pointed out 
that she used to consider herself a Hindu, but that nowadays she was a Krishna 
devotee and a member of the Hare Krishna movement, the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON).
5 ISKCON is considered a branch of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Srila Prabupada, an Indian spiritual master of 
Gaudiya Math, founded the organization in 1965 in New York. However, it became a westernized Indian 
organization as a reference to its own original tradition. See Adami (2012).  
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2. Ruckmini searching for philosophical 
comprehension for her meaning of life
According to Ruckmini, Indian Hindus worship a variety of Hindu deities as 
part of their everyday life routine. Hindus do this out of habit and sometimes 
they are not aware of the ‘real meaning’ of their religious practice. In her case, 
when she was living in India (Gujarati) with her parents she used go to the 
swami Narayan’s6 temple every day. At that time she didn’t know why she had 
to worship the deities. She simply reproduced the performance that her parents 
obliged her to follow in the temple:
They didn’t teach anything. There is nothing there basically. They just go to 
the temple to worship swami Narayan. There is no philosophy, there is no 
knowledge. They should say: you shouldn’t drink, you shouldn’t smoke, and 
you shouldn’t eat meat… after a while nothing…They didn’t talk about the 
soul, the good and bad or the three modes of material nature, or the spiritual 
soul or the incarnation… nothing!
In contrast, when Ruckmini started to visit the ISKCON temple in 
London, she noticed that there was a meaning to everything. At that time she 
was going through a conflict-ridden divorce. The classes on the Bhagavad Gita 
at the ISKCON temple were important for her because they allowed her to 
perceive the reasons for her suffering. She managed to cope with the whole 
conflict situation because of her knowledge of this tradition.
There are two important points in Ruckmini’s religious transmission. The 
first is her membership of Swami Narayan’s temple which she attended merely 
to satisfy her parents. However, when she had serious problems with her 
divorce, she began to attend a Hare Krishna temple where she found a meaning 
to her life and the explanation for some of the things that were happening in 
her life. The second point to be made is that the transmission of the religious 
tradition was in the imagistic mode because it was an ‘encounter’ of her personal 
subjectivity with the objectivity of the religious tradition. I regard this kind 
of encounter as a private institutionalization based on the imagistic mode of 
religiosity. 
6 The Swami Narayan temple is also a Vaishnava tradition. It means that they worship Vishnu as Krishna. 
However, it is totally different than the Hare Krishna movement ISKCON.
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Very broadly speaking I have argued that these three people came to 
understand the meaning of their lives through the sense of being that Hare 
Krishna devotees believe to be established by the Gaudiya Vaishnavism 
tradition. There is a difference in perception when the individual grasps the 
meaning and follows the sense of the knowledge expressed by this religious 
tradition. The perception of the individual who becomes a devotee is always 
local, that is, in accordance with his or her local and private experience, which 
could be an impacting or existential boundary experience, as mentioned above, 
or an ordinary experience. When the tradition is understood as the result of a 
high-impact personal experience, the level of institutionalization in the religious 
tradition is very high. In other words, the tradition overarches all the facts of 
the individual devotee’s life.  It is a private institutionalization: the private 
experience of the devotee depends on understanding the religious tradition. It 
takes into account the alterity of the devotee. Alterity is conceived by his/her 
personal experience, the meaning of which is understood and adjusted to the 
devotee’s own purposes through knowledge of the Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition. 
It is a private experience because only he/she can experience it. In the scenario 
of the religious tradition, devotees become the ‘authors of the experience’ 
(Adami, 2013) because they perceive what really matters in accordance with 
their personal experience. 
The other mode of institutionalization into a religious tradition is the public 
one and I have defined this experience as ‘the experience of the actor’ (Adami, 
2013). By understanding a religious tradition, the individual understands his/
her personal meaning of life and acts accordingly. However, in order to become 
part of a collective entity such as a religious community, the individual has to 
behave just like all the other members when they are in the temples, or on the 
streets chanting Hare Krishna (that is to say, when they are together in the 
public domain). This communal experience requires egalitarian performance 
and is conceptualized as the ‘experience of the actor’, because devotees must 
give the same performance to show a single underlying sense of being a devotee. 
I noticed this when I was doing fieldwork in Hare Krishna communities in 
Brazil, Spain, India, and England, especially when the devotees were gathered 
together. They would all behave in the same way to show a common idea 
underlying being a Hare Krishna devotee. It is an example of the public and 
global institutionalization of the knowledge of the Gaudiya Vaishnavism.
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I have given three examples of life history narratives. All the three devotees 
have experienced their alterity in accordance with their local context and they 
have also recognized their identities as global Hare Krishna devotees.
3. Final considerations
The issue I have been discussing – the way people can be institutionalized 
by a religious tradition – stems predominately from the individual approach. 
That’s one of the reasons I have chosen the term ‘private institutionalization’ 
to describe those who change the perception of their own lives when they 
understand a religious tradition. In this case it does not matter whether it is 
a Hindu or a Christian tradition. What is relevant to our research is to map 
how people make their changes and to see how religion operates in their social 
interactions. I am not saying that the collective influence of a religious tradition 
(public institutionalization) is irrelevant. Rather, I want to show how the 
mutual interconnection between individuals and collective entities supports 
the structure of the religious institutionalization. 
Focusing on the individual or private approach showed me that that the 
process of religious institutionalization does not alienate individuals or force 
them to act without personal coherence. As mentioned above, it is an “encounter 
of knowledge” through which the individual uses the knowledge offered by a 
religious tradition to provide his/her personal understanding with a meaning. 
In other words, the process of institutionalization into a religious tradition can 
be metaphorically considered by multifaceted discourses of knowledge.
At the beginning of the paper I made some inferences about how people 
can be institutionalized. In methodological terms, I suggested three categories 
for people who are socialized and made part of any institution. The first is the 
conception of inner self.  This is the way an individual perceives that ‘I AM’. 
In this perception there is no need to search for a category (label) to define 
the individual. However, it is embodied by ‘sense perceptions’ which lead to 
‘self-perceptions’. The second stage is ‘self-perceptions’, in which individuals 
find themselves searching for a ‘ME’ that can grasp an object and make it 
their own, like a possession. The third stage is ‘the self through others’ when 
individuals perceive their own selves through categories defined by others and 
recognize that ‘WE ARE’. All of these forms are ways of being institutionalized 
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in society. I have assumed that some dimensions would predominate over 
the institutionalization process. In the stages mentioned, the private level 
predominates in both the first and the second, while the public level completely 
predominates in the third stage. This fragmentation of predominance leads to a 
focus on individual performance and distinguishes the interconnection between 
individuals and collective entities. For example, private institutionalization 
involves searching for a private meaning of identity and its alterity. This meaning 
is based on the individual having a subjective experience in the place where 
he/she is living. The individual is the author of his/her experience. However, 
public institutionalization encourages individuals to perform the same actions 
so the individual experience resembles that of an actor who acts in response to 
a single meaning provided to everybody. Everybody tries to act like everybody 
else in order to keep a global sense of collectiveness.
I would like to clarify what I mean by the relation between private/ local 
experience and public/global experience. First of all in Lévy’s studies (2007), 
I have noticed the importance of the conception of the ‘universal without 
totality’. Lévy (2007:94) argued that the establishment of postmodernity led 
to some confusion in modern philosophy about what is conceived as universal 
with totality. According to Lévy, the universal tries to establish a unique sense 
for everything everywhere. However, this does not mean that it imposes the 
same meaning on everything in a totalitarian manner. A religious tradition 
is universal because it tries to give everybody a unique sense of belonging. 
Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, and Hare Krishnas are everywhere. 
All of these followers see themselves as part of a universal sense of religious 
tradition although this sense is not imposed by the traditions themselves.
Focusing more closely on my assumptions, the universal could be conceived 
as global. Both the universal and the global try to establish an unique sense that 
is common to everything everywhere. So I could add that the universal and 
global are categories of public institutionalization because they are permeated 
by an egalitarian ideal. I do not mean totalitarian. I will give an example: being 
part of any internet community is both universal and global. It offers the same 
sense of belonging to all individuals from different parts of the world. Broadly 
speaking, it is an example of public institutionalization. 
However, Levy’s thoughts on “the universal without totality” suggest to me 
that the meaning of the individual experience can also be singular, private and 
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local. Everywhere and in every form of institutionalization, individuals engage 
in a universal (public) institution, but this does not mean that their meaning of 
belonging is the same. The meaning is totally different, singular, and private to 
each individual. For this reason the universal is without totality. The singularity 
of the individual’s experience makes it a private institutionalization within the 
universal.
The levels of institutionalization in a religious tradition need to be classified 
if the accuracy of the data collected in a research study is to be improved. 
Focusing on social collective categories (public institutionalization) or atomic 
individuals (private institutionalization) is not the only true object of concern 
and analysis. The idea is to distinguish them and then map how individuals 
and their religious tradition can be transformed through their processes of 
private and public institutionalization.
I am aware that this article discusses nothing new. It can be regarded as 
a study in the ‘pattern of religious conversion’ tradition. However, I show 
here that a religious process of institutionalization cannot be avoided. If an 
individual understands that their life has religious meaning, they will become 
institutionalized. Whether or not they belong to a specific religious organization, 
however, the institutionalization – in the sense of knowledge of a religious 
tradition – has already been implanted in their minds as a collective thought.
Therefore, I do not agree with those authors who argue that in the 
contemporary world religion has undergone a process of deinstitutionalization. 
For example, Jean-Paul Willaime (1996) defends the idea that ‘modernity is 
also a cultural destabilization of religion which is accompanied by a trend to 
deinstitutionalization’. 
In his discussion of the classical thesis of the decline of religion and the 
more recent thesis of the privatization of religion, Casanova (1994:35) stated 
that once the religiosity of individuals shifts to the private sphere, it starts 
to undergo a process of deinstitutionalization. That is to say, the political 
links between ecclesiastical institutions and the attitudes and behaviors of 
individuals become laxer, which in practice means a substantial change in the 
expression and experience of religion.
In the ‘contemporary religious world’, then, believers and religious 
organizations can negotiate their mode of being institutionalized. However, 
the imperative of being institutionalized will always exist although to some 
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extent it will depend on the circumstance and mode of institutionalization will 
be more or less public or private. 
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